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The decisions turning on adequacy of other remedies as a bar to declaratory
relief seem grounded in a hesitancy to employ a strange device, especially
where its use appears unnecessary 3 But a consideration of such factors as
preservation of evidence and elimination of expensive suits leads to the con-
clusion that what is legally adequate may not always be expedient. For it
hardly seems likely that a plaintiff with a seemingly satisfactory remedy v.il
run the risk of having his suit dismissed by asking a declaratory judgment,
unless there are considerations making what appears adequate, inadequate,
especially where there is no reason of policy to confine the uses of the declara-
tory judgment, or to cause a plaintiff expense by dismissing an action merely
because another remedy might have been sought. The English and Dominion
courts appear to view the declaration with favor, and grant declaratory relief
as of course even though other remedies exist.74 Another reason perhaps for
the occasional application of an "inadequacy of other remedy" requirement
is a desire to avoid a multiplicity of suits, since a declaratory judgment is not
accompanied by execution, although it may be set up in a subsequent suit as
res judicata 75 A declaratory judgment against an insurance company is
equivalent to execution, however, since insurance companies are generally
responsible. And a declaration is sufficient for an insurer since he usually "
does not seek a money recovery.
In view of the suspicion with which the declaration is sometimes regarded.7
it is"possible that by a'dual process of refusing to issue declarations in un-
familiar situations, because it is said that no controversy exists, and in fa-
miliar situations, because traditional remedies are available, the courts may
steadily curtail the use of the declaration. Although an opposing trend of
substantial vigor is discernible, it is yet too early to predict with assurance
what scope the courts will ultimately give the declaratory judgment.
THE COMMODITIES CLAUSE AND THE REGULATION
OF INDUSTRIAL RAILROADS
IimusTRiAL ownership of railroads creates serious problems when those
railroads are common carriers or connect with common carriers. Typically,
an industrial plant finds it convenient and economical to build a private track
to connect with a common carrier. Its own locomotive receives from the
common carrier inbound cars loaded with raw'materials and distributes
them among its various buildings according to the requirements of the manu-
73. Nesbitt v. Manufacturers' Casualty Ins. Co., 310 Pa. 374, 165 AtL 403 (1933).
74. See cases cited note 28 .spra; as to American courts see (1932) 32 CmL L.
Rnv. 536.
75. BoRcHAR, DECLARAToRy Jummamzis (1934) 9 et. seq.
76. E.g., Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Foulke, 13 F. Supp. 350 (V. D. Mo. 1936).
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facturing process, and delivers finished products to the common carrier in
full trainload lots. Thereupon an allowance from the published freight rate
will be demanded for the performance of duties which it is claimed the
railroad is otherwise bound to perform.' The next step will be the ex-
tension of the private track- to nearby shippers and, perhaps, to other com-
mon carriers, whereupon the parent company will incorporate the railway
and claim that it is a common carrier. Tariffs will be filed with the Inter-
state Commerce Commission and through routes and joint rates2 will be
arranged with connecting common carriers for traffic moving over the new
railw.y.3 When the industrial road4 connects with several trunk lines, it
may secure large divisions of the joint rates by the threat of diverting the
parent company's traffic to other lines. Because the railroad industry is
subject to heavy fixed charges G and because it is impossible to estimate the
cost of carrying any particular item of freight,7 railroads are willing to carry
marginal freight at rates that will produce any residue, over and above out-
1. See e.g., Manufacturers Railway Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 28
I. C.C. 93, 113 (1913).
2. A through route is an arrangement between connecting railroads for the
continuous carriage of goods from the originating point on the line of one carrier
to destination on the line of another. The through rate may be the sum of the local
rates or a joint rate which is less than the sum of local rates. At common law the
carriers could not be compelled to establish through routes and joint rates. Atchison,
T. & S. R. R. Co., v. Denver & N. 0. R. R. Co., 110 U. S. 667 (1884). But the
Hepburn Act [34 STAT. 590 (1906), 49 U.S.C. 15(3) (1934)] empowered the Com-
mission to require the establishment of through routes and joint rates.
3. See e.g., Industrial Railways Case, 29 I. C. C. 212, 242-3 (1914).
4. "An industrial railway may be defined as an incorporated or unincorporated
railway controlled by some manufacturing or mining industry, the major portion of
whose traffic is furnished by the controlling company. Such a road is distinguished
from a commercial road in that it is not primarily for the sale of transportation; it
is distinguished from a purely private track or siding in that the operation of its
property gives rise to a service to which some payment or allowance may be assigned."
Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission (1910) 33.
5. The shipper's privilege to choose the railroad by which his property shall be
transported is expressly recognized by statute. 36 STAT. 553 (1910), 49 U. S. C. § 15(8)
(1934).
6. It has been variously estimated that from one-tenth to two-thirds of railway
expenditures are independent of the volume of traffic. AcWORTHc, ELEMXENTS or1 RAILWAY
EcoNOMICS (1905) 55; RIPLEY, RAILROADS, RATES AND REGLATION (1927) 55; Lorenz,
Cost and Value of Service in Railroad Rate-Making (1915) 30 QUART. J. Ecox. 205, 219.
7. Most standard treatises on railroads have emphasized the influence of these
factors on rate structures. DAGGEr, PRxNCIPLEs oF INLAND TRANSPORTATION (1928)
ch. xx; FENELN, RAILwAY EcoNoMics (1932) ch. x; JONES, PRINCIPLES OF RAILWAY
TRANSPORTATION (1927) ch. iv-v; Locxuw, EcoNomics oF TRANSPORTATION (1935)
ch. vii; 3 B. SUARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE CoMMERcE CoMMIssSION (1936) 313-329; 2
TAUSSIG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1911) h. 60; VANDERBL E & BURGESS, RAILROADS
(1923) ch. vii.
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of-ppcket costs, which may be applied to fixed charges,3 and consequently
are under pressure to grant large allowances and divisions to industrial
roads in order to secure the traffic moving over them. This pressure makes
for considerable increases in allowances and divisions to industrial roads
and shippers. What is involved is an irregular reduction of a high fixed
price in response to competition; while the reduction is economically de-
sirable from the point of view of carrier and shipper, and perhaps of the
public, it inevitably results in a freight rate preference in favor of the in-
dustry commanding the high division and against its competitors, a dis-
crimination inconsistent with the policy of the Interstate Commerce Act. A
spread of these practices, moreover, may threaten the general rate levels of
entire regions. Furthermore, unless losses occasioned by the extreme forms
of this practice are recouped by raising rates on other articles,0 the trunk
lines may be seriously wekened,'0 with consequences of weakened credit
standing, and perhaps impaired service, depending on the road's general
strength."l Secondly, such a combination endangers the advantages accruing
from tie workings of the competitive system; for, when the same business
unit is financially interested in both transportation and production, the usual
tests of success in either of the functions become indecisive.' 2 Furthermore,
industrial control of railroads facilitates violations of the distance principle
of rate-making, under which geographical advantages should find expression
in freight charges.13 Finally, since rate reductions on the type of freight
shipped by the parent company tend to remove its competitive advantage,
industrial common carriers may often exert pressure to maintain excessive
general rates, to the injury of competitors who lack such control over rail-
road service.' 4 However, these practices are not without economic justifica-
8. Fa'=rnoN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 125; Lonr nr, op. cit. .rnpra note 7, at 144-6;
2 TAussiG, op. cit. -upra note 7, at 378.
9. See Industrial Railways Case, 29 I. C. C. 212, 217 (1914).
10. That these practices result in huge depletion of railroad revenue is shown by
the fact that the Pennsylvania Railroad paid in one year $1,019,910.41 to only tea
industrial railroads. See Industrial Railways Case, 29 I. C. C. 212, 214 (1914). The
depression has made this depletion of revenue a serious problem. One of the stated
purposes of the Emergency Transportation Act rvas to "control allowances . . . to
the end that undue impairment of net earnings may be prevented." 48 S,%T. ,Z2 (1933),
49 U.S.C. § 254 (1934).
11. See FENELON, op. cit. mipra note 7, at 120; SnAnatr, TnE A.Etumxc, RAm-
ROAD PROBLEM (1921) 286.
12. Jonss, op. cit. sitpra note 7, at 118; Locnram, op. cit. mipra note 7, at 431;
SnHAamAu, RAILWAY REGuLATioN (1918) 23-5.
13. 2 T.ussiG, op. cit. supra note 7, at 363-6.
14. An officer of one industrial common carrier wrote that the parent company
should not initiate "rates for its own constituent companies that serve to reduce the
rates of other Railroads on shipments made by its patrons and competitors of the Steel
Company." United States v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 56 Sup. Ct. 841 (1936), Record
on Appeal, p. 145.
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tion. Price reduction by rebate and discrimination may be the only
alternative to monopolistically high freight rates.'8  By performing its own
transportation, moreover, the owning industry may reduce its costs of pro-
duction, and to the extent that these are reflected in lower prices, the con-
sumer will gain correspondingly. Furthermore, since privately owned
industrial sidings provide extra storage tracks and relieve trunk lines of
the necessity of increasing their terminal facilities, the owners might well
be compensated for the service they perform.18
Congress has given the Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction to
regulate the problem of allowances and divisions to industrial roads. By
the Hepburn Act the Commission was given authority to set reasonable
allowances to shippers who perform transportation services 1 and reason-
able divisions between common carriers, but this latter power became
operative only when the carriers could not agree between themselves and
appealed to the Commission."8 But, where the divisions amounted to rebates,
the Supreme Court announced that the Commission had power to regulate
them under its general authority to prevent discriminations.1" The Trans-
portation Act of 1920, however, clarified the Commission's uncertain juris-
diction over divisions of joint rates by giving it authority to instigate
proceedings and set divisions in the public interest.20
Both as to allowances to shippers.and as to divisions to industrial roads,
the Commission is first confronted with the preliminary problem of de-
termining the dividing point between transportation, which the carrier must
perform, and industrial service, which is private in character. Carload freight
is ordinarily delivered in one of two ways: the car may be placed upon a
public team track where the consignee may come and call for his freight;
or it may be placed upon a private skiing beside the consignee's plant.21 In
the latter situation the carrier's common law duty is fulfilled when the car
is switched onto the siding clear of the main track;22 in practice, however,
15. See Fly, Observations on the Anti-Trist Laws, Economic Theory and the S, gar
Institute Decisions (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1339, 1346.
16. See Associated Jobbers of Los Angeles v. Atchison, T. & S. Ry. Co., 18 I. C. C.
310, 317 (1910) ; Railroad Commissioners v. Florida E. C. Ry. Co., 42 1. C. C. 616, 622
(1917); 1 BAXNES, I TmmsTAT TPANsoRTATio (1910) § 341.
17. 34 STAT. 590 (1906), 49 U.S. C. § 15(13) (1934). An amendment (36 STAT.
553 (1910)] specifically recognizes the Commission's authority to institute proceedings
under this section.
18. 34 STAT. 589 (1906).
19. O'Keefe v. United States, 240 U. S. 294 (1916) ; see Tap Line Cases, 234 U. S.
1, 28 (1914). .
20. 41 STAT. 486 (1920), 49 U. S.C. § 15(6) (1934).
21. See Associated Jobbers of Los Angeles v. Atchison, T. & S. Ry. Co., 18 I. C. C.
310, 315 (1910) ; United States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Director General, 57
I. C. C. 677, 682 (1920).
22: See Industrial Railvays Case, 29 I. C. C. 212, 225-7 (1914).
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the carriers "spot" the cars, that is, place them in position for loading or
unloading at the plant, and this extra service is taken into consideration in
fixing the general level of rates.P Under this system the carrier's duty to
spot the cars is conditional upon the carrier's ability to operate conveniently
over the shipper's facilities24 and upon the shipper's willingness to allow the
carrier to perform the service.m' Furthermore, the carrier's service in this
respect is limited to what is termed the ",equivalent of team-track spotting: -"2 0
that is to say that, .where an industrial concern owns a huge network oE
intra-plant tracks, and delivery by the trunk line carrier to the various
buildings would entail more expense than delivery at the public team track,
transportation ends with delivery to some reasonably convenient point of
interchange and the movement of cars beyond that point is considered an
industrial service.27
As many large industrial concerns must have an engine to do intra-plant
switching and will prefer to utilize the engine's idle time in car spotting if
they may receive an allowance, the trunk lines are under pressure to replace
the spotting services with allowances. Since the carrier's privilege to employ
an agent to perform its transportation duties seems settled, -s it may arrange
for shippers to do their own spotting and give them compensation in the.
form of allowances from the published rates, but only for the performance
of that part of the spotting that is a service of transportationP But there
is no absolute duty to grant allowances. The shipper's right to secure them
is conditioned upon proof that the shipper is willing to have the carrier
perform the service 30 and that the carrier is able but refuses to spot the
23. See Interstate Commerce Commission v. Stickney, 215 U. S. 93, 105 (1939);
Associated Jobbers of Los Angeles v. Atchison, T. & S. Ry. Co., IS L C. C. 310, 314
(1910).
24. Roach Creek Coal Co. v. Ann Arbor R. R. Co., 142 L C. C. 579 (192S);
Mumby Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. & P. R. R. Co., 200 L C. C.
261 (1934) ; see Florence Pipe Foundry & Machine Co. v. Pa. R.. R. Co., 1SS L C. C
215, 216 (1932).
25. General Electric Co. v. N. Y. C. & IL R. R. R. Co, 14 L C. C. 237 (1903);
Allowances to Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 96 I. C. C. 371 (1925).
26. The spotting service rendered should not be greater than that expended in
placing cars on team tracks for consignees vho call for their property. See United
States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Director General, 57 L C. C. 677, 6S3 (1920).
Practices of Carriers Affecting Operating Revenues or Expenses, Part II, Terminal
Services, 209 I C. C. 11 (1935).
27. General Electric Co. v. N. Y. C. & !L R. R. Co., 14 L C. C. 237 (1903);
Interlake Iron Corp. Terminal Allowances, 209 L C. C. 51 (1935).
2S. See Ellis v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 237 U. S. 434, 444 (1915);
United States v. Fruit Growers Fxpress Co., 279 U. S. 353, 363 (1929).
29. General Electric Co. v. N. Y. C. & IL R. R. R. Co., 14 L C. C. 237 (1903);
Ford Motor Co. Terminal Allowances, 209 L C. C. 77 (1935).
30. General Electric Co. v. N. Y. C. & I R. R. R.Co, 14 L C. C. 237 (1903);
Marting Iron & Steel Co. Case, 48 L C. C. 620 (1918); Allowances to Texms Gulf
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cars.31 In New England and the Southeast the carriers have uniformly
refrained from granting allowances.3 2 But in other sections of the country
where there is a general practice to grant allowances, they must be granted to
each qualified shipper upon demand in order to avoid discrimination.33 In
the past the Commission has been more anxious to prevent such preferences
than to determine whether or not any particular allowance was justified.34
But with the advent of the depression the Commission, in order to preserve
carrier revenue, has turned with renewed vigor to this problem of determin-
ing which part of the spotting service. is transportation for which com-
pensation may be granted if performed by the shipper.3 5
But this problem is further complicated by the fact that many shippers
have incorporated so-called common carriers 3s to perform the spotting service
and have filed tariffs for transferring cars from the trunk lines to their own
plant doors. Since it has been the practice of each trunk line to place the
shippers in a given rate district on a parity whether located on its own line
or that of another carrier, the trunk lines have absorbed the transfer charge
of the industrial road by paying the industrial road its switching charge
out of the line haul tariff.37 The through routes and joint rates established
Sulphur Co., 96 1. C. C. 371 (1925). The shipper may prefer to do his own spotting
at his own expense because the common carrier would interfere with the operation of
the plant engine if it uses the tracks when the latter is attempting to perforni intra-plant
switching.
31. United States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Director General, 62 I. C. C.
339 (1921); Mumby Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R. Co.,
200 1. C. C. 261 (1934).
32. See Practices of Carriers Affecting Operating Revenues or Expenses, Part II,
Terminal Services, 209 I. C. C. 11, 33-4 (1935).
33. United States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Director General, 57 1. C. C.
677 (1920); Allegheny Steel Co. v. Director General, 60 I. C. C. 575 (1921).
34. United States Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Director General, 57 1. C. C.
677 (1920); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Director General, 58 I. C. C. 81 (1920);
Allegheny Steel Co. v. Director General, 60 I. C. C. 575 (1921); Florence Pipe Foundry
& Machine Co. v. Pa. R. R. Co., 188 I. C. C. 215 (1932).
35. The Commission has just recently investigated the delivery services at some
200 industrial plants. Practices of Carriers Affecting Operating Revenues or Expenses,
.Part II, Terminal Services, 209 L C. C. 11 (1935). Forty-two orders finding the
allowances unlawful were issued. Twenty-one of the orders have been attacked in the
courts. See Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission (1935) 27. Ap-
parently only one case, refusing a preliminary injunction, has so far appeared in the
reports. Koppers Gas & Coke Co. v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 467 (D. Minn. 1935).
36. Some industrial units have been forced to set up common-carriers in order to
condemn a right of way to the trunk line tracks. See Industrial Railways Case, 29
I. C. C. 212, 234-5 (1914) ; Second Industrial Railways Case, 34 I. C. C. 596, 602 (1915).
37. See Second Industrial Railways Case, 34 I. C. C. 596, 605 (1915); National
Tube Co. v. Lake Terminal Railroad Co., 55 I. C. C. 469, 479 (1919). But see Manu-
facturers Ry. Co. v. United States, 246 U. S. 457, 463 (1918).
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by this device3s shift to the common carrier the costs of that service which
was formerly performed by the plant railroad at the expense of the industrial
unit
In this situation the Commission's problem is to decide whether services
that were formerly industrial may become an integral part of the national
transportation system when the industrial road assumes all the outward
appearances of a common .carrier. The Commission's first answer to this
query was in the affirmative,40 but it was soon forced to look through legal
forms to determine whether or not the holding out as a common carrier by
the railroad subsidiary of an industrial corporation was genuine or a mere
subterfuge to secure divisions of joint rates, which it is illegal to grant to
private carriers.-a When the Commission analyzed the relation of a large
number of tap lines in the lumber district to their parent lumber companies,
it ruled that as to freight shipped by the parent company the roads were
plant facilities and not entitled to arrange and divide joint rates, but that
as to freight shipped by others, they were common carriers and entitled to
divisions.42 The Supreme Court refused to uphold a result which would
countenance such flexibility in the common carrier concept 43 In this manner
the Commission was relegated to a policy of regulation instead of one of
prohibition. 44 But this decision did not force the Commission to return to
its early attitude that compliance with legal forms transforms an industrial
road into a common carrier. Instead it announced that only those industrial
roads which were "bona fide" common carriers were entitled to arrange
divisions 45 and that such divisions should be based on the length of the
38. For another device by means of which industrial common carriers *secure
preferential treatment for their parent companies, the per diem reclaim, see Industrial
Railways Case, 29 1. C. C. 212, 231-3 (1914); Rules for Car-Hire Settlement, 160
L C. C. 369, 401 (1930), supplemental report, 165 L C. C. 495 (1930).
39. Of course, if the parent corporation was already receiving allowances as a
shipper, for the performance of "tratisportation" service, the cost would have been
previously shifted to the common carrier.
40. See Central Yellow Pine Ass'n v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R. R., 10 I. C. C. 193,
215 (1904).
41. (;entral Yellow Pine Assen v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R. R. Co., 10 I. C. C. 193
(1904).
42. Tap Line Case, 23 I. C. C. 277 (1912).
43. Tap Line Cases, 234 U. S. 1 (1914); United States v. Butler County R. R.,
234 U. S. 29 (1914).
44. The Supreme Court's preference of regulation over prohibition has been shown
in other situations. The Commission's rule that owners of grain elevators could not
receive elevation allowances on grain which they owned was also annulled. Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U. S. 42 (1911). See 2 SH ni.=r, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 142-175.
45. Industrial Railways Case, 32 L C. C. 129 (1914). The difficulty of determining
whether or not an industrial road is a "bona fide" common-carrier may be illustrated
from two cases. In the first the Commission found the road to be a plant facility; in
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haul, the most definite measure of cost of service. 46"
At best, regulation of divisions to industrial roads would seem a poor and
costly substitute for outright prohibition. Since there are some two thousand
industrial railroads in the United States,47 and since the reasonableness of
each division to each road must be separately investigated, enormous ad-
ministrative difficulties and expenses are involved,48 for numerous com-
plex factors impinge upon the problem of investigating general rate levels
and considering the justification of specific deviations from them.49 Upon
occasion, preferences other than unduly large divisions have been uncovereduO
Although the carriers may appeal to the Commission to set divisions, such
a possibility is unlikely; for when the industrial roads attempt to obtain by
bargaining more than the reasonable division that the Commission will
the second a common carrier. The Lake Terminal Case, 50 I. C. C. 489 (1918);
National Tube Co. v. Lake Terminal R. R. Co., 55 L C. C. 469 (1919), dissenting
opinion, 56 I. C. C. 272 (1920).
46. Tap Line Case, 31 I. C. C. 490 (1914). This order tended to produce in-
efficient utilization of transportation facilities. Since divisions varied with the length
of the haul, industrial roads were encouraged to use that trunk line whose connection
was furthest from the plant even though it was farther from the intended destination
than the connection of some other trunk line. O'Keefe v. United States, 240 U. S. 294
(1916); Divisions Received by Brimstone R. R. & Canal Co., 68 I. C.C. 375 (1922).
The Commission has attempted to end this evil by ordering that divisions'be measured
by the distance to that junction with a trunk line which is over the direct route of
movement toward final destination. Wasteful Services by Tap Lines, 53 1. C. C. 656
(1919), Supplemental Reports, 58 I. C. C. 450 (1920), 89 I. C. C. 327 (1924).
47. Of 2,410 industrial railroads investigated by the Commission, 364 derived revenue
from focal rates and 449 from divisions of through rates or allowances from common
carriers. Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission (1910) 33. Counsel in
one case was able to list approximately 250 terminal railroads controlled through stock
ownership by the principal shipper over their roads. United States v. Elgin, J. & E.
Ry. Co., 56 Sup. Ct. 841 (1936), Record on Appeal, p. 417-25.
48. The Lake Terminal R. R. Co. within iix years appeared in five proceedings
before the Commission. Industrial Railways Case, 29 I. C. C. 212 (1914); ibid., 32
I. C. C. 129 (1914); Second Industrial Railways Case, 34 1. C. C. 596 (1915); Lake
Terminal Case, 50 I. C. C. 489 (1918); National Tube Co. v. Lake Terminal R. R. Co.,
55 I. C. C. 469 (1919), dissenting opinion 56 1. C. C. 272 (1920).
49. The following are a few of the cases in which the Commission has investigated
the reasonableness of divisions to industrial roads. Lum v. Great Northern Ry. Co.,
33 I. C. C. 541 (1915); Northampton & Bath R. R. Co. Case, 41 I. C. C. 68 (1916);
American Steel & Wire Co. v. Newburgh & S. S. Ry. Co., 55 1. C. C. 353 (1919);
Pittsburgh, A. & M. R. R. R. Co. v. Director General, 571. C. C. 1 (1920); Chicago
Short Line Ry. Case, 58 I. C. C. 561 (1920); Manufacturers' Junction Ry. Co. Case,
58 L C. C. 666 (1920); Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. v. Director General, 60 I. C. C.
325 (1921).
.50. For example at one time the Chicago, Lake Shore & Eastern, a U. S. Steel Co.
industrial road, maintained without expense to the Illinois Steel Co., another U. S.
Steel Co. subsidiary, the miles of track within its private plant and tried to charge
these to operating costs. See In re Divisions of Joint Rates, 10 I. C. C. 385, 397 (1904).
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allow, the trunk lines are reluctant to appeal to the Commission lest they
antagonize the industrial owner and lose its freight.
A new method of prohibiting divisions to industrially controlled roads
recently attempted is the application of the commodities clause of the Inter-
state Commerce Act, which prohibits railroads to transport in interstate
commerce articles in which they have an interest, direct or indirect 5 Added
as an amendment to the Hepburn Act to wipe out monopolyr5 2 and to re-
move the danger to the rate structure5 3 caused by railroad control of the
anthracite coal mines, the clause seems to have been aimed at railroad owner-
ship of industrial units rather than at industrial control of transportation
facilities. Its treatment by the courts has been far from consistent. The
Supreme Court upheld its constitutional validity" in the first test case, but
at the same time emascuiated it by holding that it does not prohibit a. rail-
road from transporting products produced (1) by the railroad but sold
before carriage or (2) by a bona fide corporation whose capital stock is
owned by the railroad. This decision led to the reorganization of many
corporate structures so that the benefits of common ownership might be
retained through stock ownership. Although the separation of the coal and
transportation industries into two distinct corporations removed one of
the worst abuses by necessitating two bookkeeping systems which made it
possible to determine whether the discrimination came from rebates or from
loss as a producer, the basic problem in coal competition still remainedYr
By charging its wholly owned coal company the standard freight rate, the
railroad would appear to avoid discrimination; yet the coal company might
51. 34 STAT. 585 (1906), 49 U.S. C. § 1(8) (1934).
52. For an outline of this development see Bosm, THE AirrMwc rs RoAns (1927);
JoNEs, THE ANTHRAcrTE COAL Co3mmnoATioiI TEE UEir=D STATzs (1914); KinzE,
THE CoMtMoDrs Clause (1916) CI. II; Comment (1932) 41 YA=x I. 3. 439.
53. New York, N. H. & L R. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U. S.
361 (1906).
54. It was said that the power to regulate interstate commerce does not include the
power to exclude from such commerce an article, not inherently dangerous or harmful.
United States v. Delaware & H. Co., 164 Fed. 215 (C. C. . D. Pa. 1903). It was also
suggested that the commodities clause might violate due process of law. Since the
railroad-owned coal properties were mortgaged, the railroads might be deprived of all
revenue from the coal lands if the bondholders refused to consent to a sale. Lewis,
Constitutional Questions Involzrved in the Commodity Clause of the Hepbrn7 Act (1903)
21 HARv. L. R v. 595. But see Hand, The Commodities Clause and the Fifth Amend-
mcn t (1909) 22 HAav. L. R-v. 250.
55. United States v. Coal Roads, 213 U. S. 366 (1909); Anonymoa, The Coin-
modires Clause Decision (1909) 9 Coi L. REv. 523; Marshall, The Commodities
Clause (1909) 17 3. Pot.. Eco. 448; (1909) 9 Co.. L. R-. 534; (1909) 13 LAw
Nors 41.
56. See I re Relation of Common Carriers Subject to the Act to Regulate Com-
merce to Coal and Oil and the Transportation Thereof, 31 1. C. C. 193, 213 (1914);
In re Rates for Transportation of Anthracite Coal, 35 L C. C. 220, 254 (1915).
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sell coal below cost and undercut competitors with no loss to the system
as a whole, for the loss on coal sales would be recouped from profits on
transportatiofi. Furthermore, railroads were still under the incentive to
prefer the railroad controlled coal company as a shipper with better service
and more cars in times of shortage.T In later cases, however, the Supreme
Court adopted a more realistic approach, holding that administrative control
of the subsidiary by the parent and the mingling of the affairs of the two
corporations brought the clause into operation.58 The policy adopted seems
to have been that it is not power but the abuse of power that is forbidden
and, therefore, that each case must be decided on its own facts. Such an
interpretation would seem contrary to the wording of the clause, but gives
the court a large measure of. discretion in applying it. Although this policy
may seem unsatisfactory, it has gone far to accomplish the desired result
since railroad control of industries has largely ceased to exist.60
Industrial ownership of railways would seem governed by the commodities
clause, which prohibits a railroad company to transport in interstate com-
merce "any article or commodity, other than timber and the manufactured
products thereof, manufactured, mined, or produced by it, or under its author-
ity, . . . or in which it may have any interest direct or indirect." 0 0 Whether
the producing company is owned by the railroad, or the railroad by the
producing company, the railroad may be said to have an "indirect" interest
in the article transported. But, since the clause prohibits only carriage in
57. For examples of abuses see Coxe Bros. & Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 4
I. C. C. 535 (1891) (railroad sells coal in competition with complainant at less than
cost plus published freight rate); Red Rock Fuel Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R. R. Co.,
11 I. C. C. 438 (1905) (refusal to permit side track connection with complainant's
mine); Powhatan Coal & Coke Co. v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 13 I. C. C. 69
(1908) (system of car distribution that discriminates in favor of railroad owned mines);
Hillsdale Coal & Coke Co. v. Pa. Ry. Co., 19 I. C. C. 356 (1910) (railroad spiked
down complainant's siding and refused to deliver any cars).
58. United States v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 220 U. S. 257 (1911); United States
v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R. Co., 238 U. S. 516 (1915), (1916) 81 CENT. L. J. 39, (1915)
14 Micir. L. REv. 49; United States v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26 (1920), (1920)
69 U. OF PA. L. REv. 66; United States v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 254 U.S. 255
(1920), (1921) 19 MIcH. L. Rv. 553.
59. Most of the large coal roads have sold their coal properties to corporations
whose stock is held by the general public. A few still retain their coal mines but the
distribution has been turned over to outside corporations. However, some community
of interest still remains because of common control by banking firms. BoGE, op. cit.
supra note 52, at 226-40. Likewise railroad owned oil properties have been sold to
independent corporations. Venner v. Southern Pacific Co., 279 Fed. 832 (C. C. A. 2d,
1922).
60. 34 STAT. 585 (1906), 49 U.S.C. § 1(8) (1934). Congress intended to draw
no distinction between industrially owned and other common carriers. An amendment
designed to limit the clause to carriers whose principal business was that of a common
carrier was rejected. 40 CoxG. REc. 7015-7 (1906).
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interstate commerce,6' it would seem that before the clause may be applied
the industrial road's services must be services of transportation connected
with that commerce and not merely part of the industrial process.
In the first case in which an attempt was made to prohibit industrial con-
trol over railroads under the commodities clause the carrier was dearly
engaged in interstate commerce, but the Supreme Court, with three justices
dissenting, refused to hold the practices at issue within the ban of that
clause. Suit was brought by the United States to restrain the defendant
railroad, all of whose capital stock was owned by the United States Steel
Corporation, a holding company, from carrying articles mined, manufactured,
or owned by other subsidiaries of the Steel Company, alleging that such
transportation constituted a viblation of the commodities clause.02
The suit appears to be a test case to determine whether or not the com-
modities clause applies to industrial railroads.03 Undertaken at the instiga-
tion of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 4 it does not represent a
radical departure from its former policy with respect to the regulation of
divisions of joint rates. Balked in its earlier attempts to prohibit divisions
to industrial common carriers, the Commission has not abandoned its prefer-
ence of prohibition for detailed regulation. Although the enforcement of the
commodities clause was left exclusively to the Department of Justice,3 the
Commission has indicated its belief that industrially controlled railroads fall
within the prohibition of the commodities clause,00 and has refused industrial
companies permission to build short railroads connecting a plant or mine
with trunk lines on the ground that transportation of the owners' products
would be a violation of the commodities clause.G7 Furthermore, the Elgin,
61. Sisters of Providence v. Lower Vein Coal Co., 193 Ind. 645, 154 N. . 659
(1926); Central Trust Co. v. Pittsburg, S. & N. R. R. Co., 52 Misc. 195, 101 N. Y.
Supp. 837 (1906).
62. United States v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 56 Sup. Ct 841 (1936), (1936)
36 Co. L. REv. 1175.
63. (1930) 88 R wAY AGE 1600. A similar suit under the commedities clause
was instituted against the Montour R. R. Co. on Oct. 31, 1933. Annual Report of
Interstate Commerce Commission (1933) 44. At the last report it was still pending.
Ibld. (1935) 53.
64. Annual Report of Interstate Commerce Commission (1931) 15; ibid (1933) 44.
65. Ketchum v. Denver & . G. R. R. Co., 243 Fed. 106 (C. CA. Sth, 1917). The
Commission has refused to entertain complaints alleging a violation of the commodities
clause. St. Louis, T. & E. R. R. Co. Case, 57 L C C. 371 (1920); American Salt &
Coal Co. v. Chicago, R. L & P. Ry. Co., 126 I. C. C. 7 (1927); see International
Harvester Co. v. New York C R. R.. Co., 101 I. C. C. 89, 90 (1925). But see Vralley
& S. R. R. Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 53 L C. C. 397, 399 (1919).
66. See Industrial Railways Case, 32 L C C. 129, 132 (1914); Second Industrial
Railways Case, 34 I. C. C. 596, 605 (1915). But see Adriatic Mining Co. v. Chicago
& N. IV. R. R. Co., 78 L C. C. 611, 619 (1923).
67. Construction of Line by Jefferson Southwestern, 76 L C. C. 77S (1923), re-
hearing, 86 1. C. C. 796 (1924) ; Lake Decatur & E. R.. R.. Co. Proposed Acquisition,
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Joliet & Eastern Railroad was probably chosen as a defendant because it
is not completely a one industry road."" It operates what is essentially a
transfer route around Chicago connecting with every railroad entering the
city. It also connects with all the subsidiaries of the United States Steel
Company in the Chicago area, and sixty percent of its tonnage is carried to
and from these subsidiaries. Since its route does not extend beyond the
Chicago area,69 its principal function with regard to Steel Company freight
is to carry it to connecting trunk lines and receive divisions of joint rates.
Although most of the road's freight comes from subsidiaries of the Steel
Company, the government was able to argue .that the Elgin is not what is
commonly called an industrial road,70 and in this manner attempted to con-
ceal the new ipplication of the commodities clause.
The majority of the Court, however, assumed, and the minority expressly
declared, that the clause applies to industrial railroads. Facing the relation-
ship of the railroad to the parent industrial corporation, all the justices
agreed that mere stock ownership is not the test by which the legality of
the carriage is to be determined. Whether or not the railroad has an illegal
interest in the goods transported is a question of fact to be decided by
examining the degree of control exercised by the parent company over the
railroad in addition to the control normally permissible through stock owner-
ship. Six justices upheld the finding of the District Court that "no single
piece of evidence taken alone, nor all taken together and considered as a
whole, warrant the inference that the defendant and the producing and man-
ufacturing subsidiaries are under the domination, control, direction, and
management of the Steel Corporation in the sense that the defendant and
175 I. C. C. 405 (1931) ; Tittabawassee R. R. Co. Proposed Construction, 189 I. C. C.
563 (1933). Contra: Upper Merion & P. R. R. Co. Acquisition, 166 I. C. C. 351 (1930).
68. Another factor that may account for the suit is the fact that Elgin, Joliet &
Eastern since 1920 has been granting allowances on an increasingly large scale and has
forced the other carriers in the Chicago area to follow suit. See Practices of Carriers
Affecting Operating Revenues or Expenses, Part II, Terminal Services, 209 1. C. C.
11, 37 (1935).
69. The Elgin has a trackage agreement with the Chicago & Eastern Illinois Rail-
road Co. whereby the former is granted the privilege of operating over the latter's
right of way to and from the Steel Company's mines in Southern Illinois. To be sure
the subsidiaries of the Steel Company pay the Elgin the same rates that other shippers
pay the Chicago & Eastern for a similar haul. But, as the Steel Company receives
the profits in dividends, it acquires an advantage over competitors to the extent that
the divisions, which the Chicago & Eastern would otherwise receive, exceed the amount
of the rental plus the cost of operating the trains over the Chicago & Eastern's tracks.
See lit re Relation of Common Carriers to Coal & Oil and the Transportation Thereof,
31 I. C. C. 193, 210 (1914). But see In re Divisions of Joint Rates and Other Allow-
ances to Terminal Railroads, 10 I. C. C. 385, 404 (1904), where it was said concerning
this lease, "If the Steel Trust can build and operate a railroad cheaper than it can
hire transportation from some other railroad, that is its privilege . . .
70. Brief for appellant, p. 105-14; (1936) 57 TRAFFic WoRL 685.
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the other subsidiaries are mere departments, branches, adjuncts, and instru-
mentalities of the Steel Corporation."71 The dissent, however, believed that
enough domination and control had been shown to bring the transportation
within the prohibition of the commodities clause.
The majority declared that the commodities clause is applicable only when
some measure of control more direct than stockholding accompanies stock
ownership, and seemed to be requiring a quantum of control sufficient to
charge the parent for the debts or torts of the subsidiary; but this view
seems highly insensitive to the underlying policy of the statute that common
carriers should have no interest that conflicts with their duty to treat all
shippers alike.P Because the carrier has an incentive to discriminate in
such a situation and because such discriminations are difficult to uncover, it
might well have been held that to apply the language and fulfill the policy
of the act required the conclusion that stock ownership, at least when con-
siderable enough to support an inference that controlling power exists,
creates the forbidden "interest." But however much such a view of the
commodities clause might simplify administration of the Act, the Supreme
Court was already committed to the view that stock ownership was not
enough to make it applicable. In no previous case in which it considered
the issue, however, had the court determined that the measure of control
needed to bring the clause into operation was lacking.
Courts have been reluctant to disregard the corporate entity when the
formalities of separate existence have been complied with in private litigation
where attempts have been made to hold parent companies for torts73 and on
contracts of iubsidiaries, or to obtain jurisdiction over the parent by service
on the subsidiary,75 or to prove a parent's claim in the bankruptcy or re-
ceivership of its subsidiary -Y0 But, when two corporations have been so
assimilated in administration that they may be considered one, or when the
71. United States v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 11 F. Supp. 435, 444 (N. D.
I1. 1935).
- 72. See United States v. Delaware, Lackawanna & W. R. L Co., 233 U. S. 516,
525 (1915) ; United States v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26, 60 (1920).
73. Friedman v. Vandalia R. R. Co., 254 Fed. 292 (CC. A. Sth, 191) ; Berkey v.
Third Avenue Ry. Co., 244 N. Y. 84, 155 N. E. 53 (1926) ; Bergenthal v. State Garage
& Trucking Co., 179 Wis. 42, 19D N. NV. 901 (1922) ; see Douglas & Shanks, Insulation
Front Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations (1929) 39 YA=x. L. J. 193, 195-210.
74. Majestic Co. v. Orpheum Circuit, Inc., 21 F. (2d) 720 (C. C. A. Sth, 1927);
Marsh v. Southern New Eng. R. IL Co., 230 Mass. 433, 120 N. E. 120 (1918) ; ef. First
Nat'l Bank of Seattle v. Walton, 146 Wash. 367, 262 Pac. 934 (1928); see Douglas &
Shanks, loc. ct. 4spra note 73, at 210.
75. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Pkg. Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925) ; Selhert v. Lan-
caster Chocolate & Caramel Co., 23 F. (2d) 233 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928); see L L. REP.
No. 2789, 71st Cong., 3rd Sess. (1931) 13.
76. Duffy v. Treide, 75 F. (2d) 17 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935); cf. Wheeler v. Smith,
30 F. (2d) 59 (C. C. A. 9th; 1929) ; see Comment (1936) 45 YATL L J. 1471.
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parent has exercised such control over its subsidiary that the former may
be said to operate the latter, claimants against the subsidiary have reached
the parent despite the separate identity of the two corporations.77 There is
no reason, however, why the large measure of control necessary to break down
the corporate entity in suits involving private interests should be required
in the Elgin case, where separate incorporation is part of a scheme to reach
an end prohibited by statute.73 In practice the courts have recognized the
validity of such a distinction between the public and the private law contexts
in which the parent-subsidiary problem appears, and have often disregarded
the corporate entity with little or no evidence of control when necessary. to
enforce the policy of the law.79
But even if the strict test of control is applied to this situation, as the
Supreme Court indicated, it would seem to have been satisfied iri the Elgin
case. Although there were no interlocking directorates nor common officers,
although the accounts of the two corporations were strictly separated, and
although the Elgin had an adequate capital structure, there was a large
measure of community of interest evidenced by constant requests by the
Elgin's officers for advice from the Steel Company's officers, and consequent
participation by the parent in the executive and policy-making activities of
the subsidiary. There was considerable evidence of direct control. Dividends
were declared only with the consent of the Steel Company's officers; surplus
funds were deposited with the Steel Company; and the Elgin, like all other
subsidiaries of the Steel Corporation, was required to obtain the approval
of the Steel Company's finance committee before making any capital ex-
penditures over $5,000.80 There was, moreover, some evidence of com-
mingling of corporate affairs and of representation that the separate corporate
77. Luckenback S. S. Co. v. Grace & Co., 267 Fed. 676 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920);
Costan v. Manila Electric Co., 24 F. (2d) 383 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928) ; Centmont Corp. v.
Marsch, 68 F. (2d) 460 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933); Gordon v. Baton Rouge Stores Co., 168
La. 247, 121 So. 759 (1929); Ross v. Pa. R. R. Co., 106 N. J. Law 536, 148 At. 741
(1930).
78. LATTY, SUBSIDrARI= & AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS (1936) c. 2; Ballantine,
Separate Entity of Parent and Sabsidiary Corporations (1925) 14 CALIF. L. REV. 12, 14.
Incorporation was not resorted to with any intent to avoid the operation of the com-
modities clause since the Steel Company acquired control of the Elgin in 1901, five
years before the clause was enacted. However, intent would seem to be immaterial since
the clause was applied in United States v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26 (1920), where a
similar corporate organization was formed in 1896.
79. Linn & Lane Timber Co. v. United States, 236 U. S. 574 (1915); Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis C. & C. Ass'n, 247 U. S. 490 (1918); United States
v. Walter, 263 U. S. 15 (1923) ; United States v. Milwaukee Ref. Transit Co., 142 Fed.
247 (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1905); Brundred v. Rice," 49 Ohio St. 640, 32 N. E9. 169 (1892);
cf. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904); see H. R. REPS. No.
2789, 71st Cong., 3rd. Sess. (1931) 21-28; Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate
Entity (1912) 12 COL. L. R.v. 496, 517.
80. From 1920 to 1932 the limit was $10,000.
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entities were one. The railroad's employees participated in the same manner
as all employees of the Steel Company and of its other subsidiaries in profit
sharing, bonus, and stock purchase plans.
Although the instant case settles the application of the commodities clause
to industrial common carriers, the government has won an illusory victory;
for the difficulty of showing enough control to satisfy the court that the
industrial road would be considered a mere "instrumentality" of the parent
company for other purposes is almost insuperable. Two possible methods of
removing the carriers' incentive to grant excessive divisions to industrial
roads, both requiring legislation, remain; one is to amend the commodities
clause so that stock ownership by or of a railroad would create an illegal
interest in the article transported; the other, altogether to forbid divisions
on tonnage shipped by the proprietary industry.
